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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH

DONA R. BULLOCK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case No
13697

vs 0
HERBERT JOHN UNGRICHT,
et al.,
Defendants and Respondents.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Appellant Dona R. Bullock respectfully petitions
the Court for a rehearing in this cause upon grounds as follows:
I.
The trial court erred in refusing to exclude certain
inflammatory evidence highly prejudicial to the Appellant's
cause, and this Court erred in sustaining the judgment of the
trial court based thereonc
WHEREFORE, Appellant asks for a rehearing in this
cause, that the matter be reconsidered and upon such rehearing
the Court grant a new trialc
ORRIN G. HATCH
WINSTON LANGLOIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Suite 420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84010
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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BRIEF IN
SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR REHEARING
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by the Plaintiff/Appellant, Dona
R. Bullock, against the Defendants/Respondents, Herbert John
Ungricht, et al., for injuries and damages sustained as a result
of an automobile accident.
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
A jury award of no cause of action in favor of the
Defendants was rendered April 4, 1974, before the Honorable
Bryant H. Croft, District Judge of the Third Judicial District.
A motion for a new trial was heard and denied.

From the denial

of such motion and from the judgment, the Plaintiff appealed.
This Court affirmed the judgment below.

Bullock v. Ungricht,

(decision no. 13697, filed July 17, 1975).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON THIS PETITION
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the trial
court and a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff's cause of action arises from an automobile
accident that took place on December 16, 1971 at 1435 East 33rd
South Street in Salt Lake City, Utah at about 9:30 p.m. (R.
246-249).

According to Defendants1 version of the accident,
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after Defendants had made a left-hand turn onto 33rd South Street
from Highland Drive, they noticed erratic accelerating and
slowing by the Plaintiff's vehicle in front of them.

Defendant

claims to have slowed his car at this time to observe what Plaintiff's vehicle would do but subsequently and unavoidably slammed
into the rear of Plaintiffs' car when it stopped abruptly to
make a left turn.

There was testimony by investigating officers

that the road surface was coated with black ice.

(R. 581, 608).

Defendant claims there were no cars in the westbound lanes that
would have required the Plaintiff to stop before turning left.
According to the Plaintiff's version of the accident,
she had turned left onto 33rd South Street.

She was stopped

on 33rd South Street in the centermost eastbound lane with her
left-turn signal blinking, waiting for traffic to clear to allow
her to turn left into the driveway of an apartment building.
She noticed headlights approach rapidly in the rearview mirror
and shortly thereafter her automobile was struck from the rear
by the Defendants' automobile.

The resulting impact caused

serious permanent damage to the Plaintiff's sixth cervical nerve,
necessitating the removal of two cervical discs.
In addition to negligence and contributory negligence,
an issue had originally been raised with respect to the Plaintiff's lost earnings resulting from her injuries.

Plaintiff

claimed $8,000.00 in wages lost due to her inability to continue
to work as the sales director for Utah American Corporation.
Midway through the trial, the court removed the issue

-3-
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of the Plaintiffs lost earnings from the jury's consideration
on the grounds that the evidence of lost earnings was too speculative to support an award for the same0

(R. 430),

After the trial court eliminated the Plaintiff's lost
earnings as a triable issue, the trial court refused to remove
evidence from the jury's consideration that was admissible only
for its probative value with respect to the issue removed.
(R. 431). Such evidence, improperly kept before the jury,
was inflammatory and greatly damaged the Plaintiff's credibility
in the eyes of the jury.

The factual circumstances of the

court's improper ruling in this respect will be set forth in
more detail in Plaintiff's argument.
The jury deliberated more than five hours before returning a verdict of no cause action, and never reached the issue
of damages.
ARGUMENT
THIS COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE TRIAL COURT'S ERRONEOUS INSISTENCE THAT INFLAMMATORY AND HIGHLY PREJUDICIAL EVIDENCE
REMAIN BEFORE THE JURY NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH EVIDENCE
WAS RELEVANT AND ADMISSIBLE ONLY FOR ITS PROBATIVE VALUE WITH
RESPECT TO AN ISSUE PREVIOUSLY REMOVED FROM THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION.
The trial court's erroneous ruling arose in the
following manner.

The Plaintiff had called several witnesses

to testify concerning her earning abilities as they related
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to her claim for lost earnings.

The fact that her employer,

Utah American Corporation, had not yet begun to do business
was elicited.

While cross-examining the Plaintiff, Defendant's

counsel introduced the Plaintiff's prior act of bankruptcy in
the following manner:
Q Your business venture as a salesman for Inch
Master was very unsuccessful, was it not, Mrs. Bullock?
A

Correct.

Q And, in fact, it resulted, did it not, in the
filing of a bankruptcy petition by you in April of
1971?
A

Yes, it did.

MR. LANGLOIS: Your Honor, I really have no objection to our going into this. It really doesn't mean
anything. I fail to see the relativity of it. That is
the thing I am concerned about. What is a fact is a
fact. I fail to see how this has anything to do with
this case. The only reason her business operation -THE COURT: Just a moment, Mr. Langlois.
object to the question?

Do you

MR. LANGLOIS: I object because it is irrelevant,
incompetent and immaterial.
THE COURT:

Overruled.

I think it is material.

Q (By Mr. Eyre) The bankruptcy petition which
you .filed, Mrs. Bullock, was the cause, I assume, of some
additional emotional upset and trauma for you, was it
not?
A

Yes.

Q And that continued for quite a period of time,
did it not?
A Not, it didn't.
all over.

It was a relief to have it

Q Well, it wasn't quite all over when you filed
it, was it? Mainly, isn't it a fact, Mrs. Bullock,

-5-
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i
that certain of your creditors, namely, First Security
Bank, Walker Bank $ Trust Company filed actions against
you in the bankruptcy court alleging that you had
incurred obligations to them through the use of misrepresentation?
•

•

•

•

*
1
|
i

Q (By Mr. Eyre) Mrs. Bullock, as a result of, the
bankruptcy proceedings were judgments entered against
you in favor of First Security Bank of Utah and Walker
Bank § Trust Company and are those judgments still
not paid? (R. 395-97).

I
'

There was, therefore, introduced into evidence over the

I

objection of the Plaintiff's counsel, the fact of Plaintiff's

i

prior bankruptcy, the fact that two creditors had filed claims
against the Plaintiff alleging misrepresentations by her, and
the fact that those claims resulted in two judgments against
the Plaintiff that remained unpaid.

I

The tendency of such evidence to destroy the credibility
of the Plaintiff in the eyes of the jury is self-evident.

The

issue of how and on what terms such evidence may properly be
submitted to and remain before the jury is crucial in determining
whether the Plaintiff had been denied her right to a fair trial
of her action for negligently inflicted personal injuries.
The trial court and counsel for both parties clearly
stated the theories upon which they either favored or opposed
retention of the challenged evidence during an off-the-record
discussion of the matter, recorded at pages 412 to 436 of the
official record.
At page 415, line 30, to page 416, line 13, the Defendants1 counsel lists his purposes in submitting the challenged
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]

evidence;
t . . I recognize that counsel doesn't like it
because, in my judgment, it will have an adverse effect
and that is wny I am seeking to introduce it. I will
be quite candid with the Court. It does have probative
value because it deals directly with her ability to
earn and her sales ability, her general business
ethics, which I think are relevant if she is going
to assert a claim for lost income because of this
business venture she was in.

In addition to that, it goes to the claim for
pain and suffering, which her doctor says, at least,
when he last examined, he felt was caused by the
emotional functional overlay. In addition to that,
I think it does have some probative value concerning
her credibility and I will submit it on that basis.
Defendant's counsel thus expressly offered the evidence
of the Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy and undischargeable debts
for its value for discrediting the Plaintiff apart from, and
in addition to, whatever value it had for rebutting the Plaintiff's claim for lost earnings.

The Defendant's counsel, there-

fore, submitted the fact of the Plaintiff's bankruptcy and her
undischargeable and unpaid debts as specific acts tending to
destroy the credibility of the Plaintiff.

Even had the

issue of the Plaintiff's earning capacity not been previously
eliminated as a trial issue by the trial court, it was reversible
error for the trial court to refuse to give the jury an instruction limiting its consideration of the challenged evidence to
the issue of the Plaintiff's lost earnings.
The reversible error of the trial court was compounded
when the trial court itself removed the issue of the Plaintiff's
lost earnings from the jury's consideration (R. 430). It subsequently refused to strike the evidence of the Plaintiff's
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act of bankruptcy and of her undischargeable and unpaid debts
or to instruct the jury to disregard them.

At this point in

the trial, the only relevance of the challenged evidence was
its tendency to destroy the credibility of the Plaintiff.

To

affect the credibility of a witness by introducing evidence
of her specific acts relevant only as tending to prove a trait
of character is expressly forbidden by Rule 22(c), Utah Rules
of Evidence.

The Plaintiff submits that if it violates Rule

22(c) to introduce evidence of specific acts relevant only
for their tendency to affect the general credibility of a witness, it is, by necessary inference, a violation of Rule 22(c)
not to strike such evidence when it later becomes irrelevant
except for its tendency to affect the general credibility of
a witnesSo
Here the trial court refused to strike evidence of
the Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy and of suffering judgments
based in part on allegations of misrepresentation, after such
evidence had become irrelevant except for its tendency to affect
the general credibility of the Plaintiff.

This error was raised

by the Plaintiff in her initial brief on appeal but not considered by this Court in its opinion.
Should there be any doubt that the trial court, while
exercising its discretion to exclude evidence admissible for
some purposes but inadmissible for others, contemplated that
the challenged evidence would be used to attack the general
credibility of the Plaintiff, that doubt is dispelled by the

-8-
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trial court's following direction to counsel:
MR. LANGLOIS; And the bankruptcy, for whatever
that is worth, I guess he can talk about it and so
can I then?
THE COURT: You ought to talk about it only
insofar as it might affect credibility. If I take
from the jury the question of special damages for
loss of earnings, as I think I will do based upon
what I have heard so far, then you shouldn't discuss
either the business venture that was intended or the
bankruptcy as affecting the success -- the probable
success of that business in your argument to the jury.
(R. 434-435).
Should there be any doubt about the determination
of the trial court to keep the challenged evidence before the
jury, that doubt is dispelled by its refusal of the motion of
Defendant's counsel to strike the prayer for lost earnings from
the Plaintiff's complaint, despite the consent of counsel for
both parties to such motion.

(R. 432).

There is little room for doubt that the evidence of
Plaintiff's act of bankruptcy, of the claims against her alleging misrepresentation, and of the unpaid judgments resulting from
those claims seriously damaged her credibility with the jury.
The Plaintiff's account of the accident was clear and concise.
If believed, it compelled a finding of negligence on the part
of the Defendant and an absence of contributory negligence on
the Plaintiff's parte

The fact the jury deliberated for more

than five hours before returning a verdict of no cause of action
in favor of the Defendant demonstrates the closeness of the
question of credibility in the minds of the jury and the high
probability that the improperly retained evidence tipped the
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1
scales on that issue against the Plaintiff.

The Plaintiff's

I

right to a fair trial of her claim for personal injuries negligently inflicted was thereby denied.

I

CONCLUSION
This Court failed to consider the prejudicial error
of the trial court in two respects.

I
i

First, the error of the

trial court in receiving inflammatory and highly prejudicial
evidence of the Plaintiff's specific acts for the tendency to
rebut material evidence but refusing to instruct the jury to

|

limit its consideration of such inflammatory evidence to the

i

issue for which it was offered.

Second, the error of the trial

court in refusing to strike inflammatory and highly prejudicial
evidence of the Plaintiff's specific acts after such evidence
had become irrelevant except for its tendency to affect the
general credibility of the Plaintiff, violating, by necessary
inference, Rule 22(c) of.the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Respectfully submitted,

ORRIN G. HATCH
WINSTON LANGLOIS
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
Suite 420 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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